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THE MAKING OF CULTURAL POLICY: 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 




No good comparable data on sizes of cultural sectors of the countries of Europe exist. Still, 
local and national governments of Europe spend substantial resources on culture and cultural 
sectors contribute significantly to employment and national income. After briefly describing 
special features of cultural goods and clarifying some misconceptions about the value of 
culture, valid and invalid arguments for subsidising culture are discussed. Although it is easy 
to justify government support for preservation of heritage, this is more difficult for the 
performing arts. Due to changing technologies and advent of E-culture classic public-good 
arguments for government intervention in broadcasting and other cultural activities become 
less relevant. Different institutions varying from selection by arts councils, bureaucrats or 
politicians to less directed tax incentives lead to different cultural landscapes. Theories of 
delegation suggest delegating the judgement on artistic qualities and execution of cultural 
policy to an independent Arts Fund. The Minister of Culture should concentrate on 
formulating a mission for cultural policy and make sure it is implemented properly. The 
insights of the theories of local public goods and federalism are applied to the making of 
cultural policy in Europe. Different approaches to international cultural policy in Europe are 
discussed. The overview concludes with lessons for the making of cultural policy in Europe. 
JEL Code: H2, H4, P51, Z11. 
Keywords: cultural policy, heritage, performing arts, museums, quality, participation, 
vouchers, tax incentives, quality, politicians, bureaucrats, delegation. 
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In Europe the market and the arts are often unhappy bedfellows. Many music lovers believe that only 
subsidised symphony orchestras and classical music ensembles perform good music. Commercial 
symphony orchestras and musical ensembles may accompany musicals, operettas and the popular operas 
of Verdi, Puccini, Rossini and Wagner or play classical music for the millions. However, they will not 
accompany difficult or contemporary operas or stage difficult, more esoteric pieces of classical music for 
fear of frightening away the public. If they do, they will loose money. Similarly, many argue that only 
subsidised theatre will stage the more difficult and artistically valuable theatre repertoire. Commercial 
theatre will concentrate on the lighter stuff such as comedy, cabaret or Christmas pantomimes. 
Commercial theatre in the West End of London can survive due to millions of tourists that grasp the 
English language, but this is unlikely elsewhere in Europe. The big London museums such as the Tate, 
the Tate Modern and the British Museum can also survive with less subsidy than in other European 
towns. Still, top museums in the European capitals thrive on one old master, for example the ‘superstars’ 
Velasquez in Madrid’s Prado, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre or Rembrandt’s Night Watch in the 
Rijksmuseum of Amsterdam. Of course, a museum that strives to show and maintain a large and varied 
collection and undertake research needs a larger subsidy. Exposition centres (e.g., the Kunsthal-concept) 
may be able to thrive commercially or on little government subsidy. 
  Culture in the Low Countries moved from the Renaissance onwards to satisfy demands of ordinary 
people. In contrast, Italy cherished following Vasari the judgement of independent taste critics. In a 
similar vain John Stuart Mill said `the uncultivated cannot be competent judges of cultivation. Those who 
most need to be made wiser and better, usually desire it least, and, if they desire it, would be incapable of 
finding the way to by their own lights' - see Blokland (1997, p. 89). Today much of the cultural elite of 
Europe finds commercial culture suspect and argues that subsidies for high culture are essential. Even 
though national, regional and local governments of Europe hand out sizeable cultural subsidies, the belief 
in the contradiction between market and quality looses strength. Some countries now require cultural 
organisations to get a minimum amount of box office receipts and sponsor income. 
  Still, commercial culture offers many marvels throughout Europe. In the past this was true as well. 
William Shakespeare wrote his best work for the people's theatre and managed to pull in the crowds in a 
fierce competitive environment – witness Baz Luhrmann’s film on Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet and 
Elizabethan times with Leonardo DiCaprio and Claire Danes in the lead roles. Contemporary Europe has 
excellent museums that flourish without any subsidy at all. There are commercial theatre productions 
whose quality of performances are at least as good from a high-culture point of view as those of 
subsidised theatre groups. There are a growing number of cultural entrepreneurs who reject subsidies in 
the same way as the market was condemned before. They cherish their autonomy and succeed without     
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the bother and humiliation of going through awkward committees to get subsidy. Still, much of 
subsidised culture does not (want to) realise that they will loose significance unless they reach out to new 
and more diverse audiences and make use of modern marketing techniques. The subsidised arts cater 
largely for white, higher educated audiences and not to the huge influx of immigrants in many parts of 
Europe. In addition, technological advances change the character of many cultural goods and question the 
rationale of government support for the arts. Why (if at all) and how should the government subsidise 
production and showing of contemporary arts? Why and how should it finance the collection, upkeep and 
display of cultural treasures? How does the political process influence public support for the arts? 
  Culture pessimists criticise the `market', because it encourages a money-oriented and culturally 
impoverished way in which people live together. They fear a world where people, artists and cultural 
organisations are merely treated as buyers or sellers of goods and services. The market demands 
purchasing power, not background, education or culture. Who pays, joins in. Market forces dumb down 
expressions of high culture in order to get mass attention. Culture thus becomes part of the entertainment 
industry. These critics prefer culture to be expressed in ivory towers for refined elite audiences that make 
an effort to understand what it is all about. Using economics to understand cultural policy is considered 
philistine. Ministers of culture are treated with contempt unless they bring more cash and no opinions on 
culture or cultural policy are offered. Cultural pessimists share with medics the zealous emphasis on 
professional autonomy. Professionals, not politicians must decide which artistic expressions are worthy. 
Professional autonomy is valuable until it is abused to defend or boost government subsidies. Economists 
tend to count the blessings of the market. The market mechanism often works better and generates higher 
welfare than central planning (as often is the case for allocation of arts subsidies). Cowen (1998) argues 
that the market produces a great variety and quality of culture, not just homogeneous pulp. It produces 
plenty of low culture, but that is what many people want and the market does produce high culture niches 
for the elite. Globalisation and Internet allow economies of scale and enable the market to produce 
diversity and variety. Robbins (1963) and Peacock (1969) derive the case for cultural policy from 
concern with the public interest and the need to correct markets that fail to deliver Pareto-optimal 
outcomes. Public goods, externalities, natural monopolies, information asymmetries and frictions thus 
need to be considered. One also needs to consider equity, and non-economic issues such as distinction, 
connectivity, security and internal motivation. 
  Some shy away from government interference as this may conflict with creativity or, worse, 
artistic freedom. `State Art' has connotations with the Third Reich, some dictatorships today and even 
present-day Italy. Culture may be better served by socially responsible entrepreneurs and civic 
responsibility, which has a long tradition in the US and Europe. Grampp (1989) rejects even this. He 
claims that the public interest is not served by cultural policy at all, since subsidies only serve the self-    
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centred interests of members of a passionate minority. Regardless of whether he is right, we must reckon 
with market and government failures in the making of cultural policy. 
  Europe has different systems of cultural policy, each with their own merits and distortions. We 
distinguish the state-driven, bureaucratic systems in, say, France or Italy and the arms-length approach of 
the UK, Netherlands and Scandinavia. We differentiate between the UK with an independent Arts 
Council and no ministerial responsibility and countries such as the Netherlands with an independent Arts 
Council and ministerial responsibility. In the latter case the Arts Council recommends, but the Minister of 
Culture decides and is held responsible by the parliament. Finally, Germany has almost no federal 
cultural policy and delegates most of the making of cultural policy to the Länder. In assessing the various 
systems we adopt a political-economy perspective and make use of the theories of delegation and of local 
public goods, clubs and federalism. Before that can be done, we must understand the nature of cultural 
goods and point out valid and invalid arguments for subsidising cultural activities. We also examine the 
costs and benefits of different kinds of government intervention varying from government handouts to 
tax incentives and special regulations for cultural exceptions. 
  Sector 2 presents indicators of the different sizes of cultural sectors in Europe. Section 3 discusses 
the nature and value of cultural goods. Section 4 considers how technical innovation and Baumol's cost 
disease affect the case for cultural subsidies. Section 5 shows how the  way of allocating cultural 
subsidies affects quality, diversity and popularity of culture in Europe. Instruments vary from privileged 
positions and tax incentives to direct grants for cultural activities. Section 6 discusses subsidy allocation 
by grant-giving arts councils, advisory arts councils and bureaucrats. Lobbying and rent seeking are 
considered. The crucial questions are which powers should be delegated to bureaucrats or the Arts 
Council, and what mission, guidelines and criteria the Minister should give bureaucrats or the Arts 
Council. Section 7 discusses the principle of subsidiarity and applies the theory of local public goods, 
clubs and federalism to cultural policy making in Europe. This explains cultural competition between 
regional governments and sheds light on federalist systems as Germany. Section 8 discusses approaches 
to international cultural policy in Europe. Section 9 concludes.  
 
2. Indicators of cultural sectors in Europe: size and participation 
2.1 Cultural employment in Europe 
Table 1 presents estimates employment in cultural enterprises including non-cultural occupations and 
groups them according to the NACE-classification. Cultural activities amounted in 2002 to about 3.9 
million working persons in Europe (excluding Poland and Malta); 3.5 million in the EU-15. This reflects 
2.1 per cent of the working population. Employment in cultural enterprises is relatively high in Denmark 
(2.6 per cent), Sweden (2.7 per cent), Finland (2.9 per cent), the Netherlands (2.5 per cent), Ireland (2.4     
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per cent) and the UK (2.8 per cent). It is relatively low in southern Europe; e.g., Italy (1.4 per cent), Spain 
(1.7 per cent) and Portugal (1.2 per cent). More than half of people employed in the cultural sector has an 
artistic or cultural activity.  
 
Table 1: Shares of employment in cultural enterprises in Europe in 2002 
 
Percentage EU-15  EFTA New  members  Total 
Publishing 26  31  17  26 
Artistic and cultural 
Activities 
56 51  65  56 
Retail of books, 
Newspapers and 
Stationary 
7 7  7  7 
Architecture 11  11  11  11 
Total 100  100  100  100 
 
Source: Definition and Production of Harmonized Statistics on Culture in Europe, Chapter 2: 
Employment in cultural activities (2002), Eurostat, February 2004. 
 
  Table 2 uses the ISCO-classification and looks at cultural occupations only. There are about 2.9 
million people working in cultural occupations in Europe, 2.5 million in the EU-15, 0.1 million in the 
EFTA and 0.3 million in the new EU countries. This represents 1.5 per cent of the employed working 
population of Europe, albeit slightly less in new EU countries. The share of cultural occupations in total 
employment is particularly high in Sweden (2.3 per cent), Finland (2.1 per cent), Denmark and the UK 
(1.9 per cent), the Netherlands (2.0 per cent), and Spain (2.2 per cent). The shares in France (1.2 per 
cent), Belgium and Austria (1.3 per cent), Luxemburg (1.0 per cent), Germany (1.5 per cent), Greece (1.4 
per cent) and Portugal (0.7 per cent) are lower than the EU-average. These figures refer to both 
commercial and subsidised cultural employment. 
  Table 3 gives the shares of the various types of cultural occupations in Europe. The largest 
category is writers and creative or performing artists (45 per cent). The second largest group in the EU-15 
and EFTA is artistic and entertainment associate professionals (25 and 34 per cent, respectively), but in 
new EU countries the second largest group is information professionals including archivists and 
librarians (21 per cent). Shares of various cultural occupations do not vary much across countries of 
Europe. A large fraction of cultural occupations is in the commercial sector.     
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Table 2: Employment in cultural occupations in Europe in 2002 
 
 
Thousands  BE DK GE GR  SP  FR  IR  IT LU NL AU PO FI SW UK 
Information  6.0 6 39 1  17  44 2 26  0.3 7  2  2  6 12 36 
Creation and 
performance 
26  21 243 19  61  144 14 183 0.5 94  29 17 29  57 176 
Image and 
sound 
5 5 52  6 30 27  2  31  0.3  13 4 6 3  11  51 
Art and 
entertainment 
4 15  114  16 53 37 7 41  0.4  42 12 5 8 14  241 
Architects  10 6 104  14 27 27 2 67  0.4 5  3  5 4  5 31 
Total  50 53 55  57  187 280 28  348  1.9  161 50 35 50 98 536 
Percentage  1.3 1.9 1.5 1.4  2.2  1.2  1.
6 
1.6 1.0 2.0 1.3 0.7 2.1 2.3 1.9 
 
Key:  Percentage of employed working population 
 
Table 3: Shares of various cultural occupations in Europe 
 
Percentage EU-15  EFTA  New  EU  Total 
Information 8  10 21 10 
Creation and 
Performance 
45 40 47 45 
Image and sound  10  6  10  10 
Art and 
Entertainment 
25 34 15 24 
Architects 12 9  7 11 
Total  100 100 100 100 
 
Key: Information consists of archivists, librarians and related information professionals (ISCO 243). 
Creation and performance are writers and creative or performing artists (ISCO 245). Image and sound     
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correspond to photographers and image and sound recording equipment operators (ISCO 3131). Art and 
entertainment are decorators and commercial designers (ISCO 3471), radio, television and other 
announcers (ISCO 3472), street, nightclub and related musicians, singers and dancers (ISCO 3473), and 
clowns, magicians, acrobats and related associate professionals (ISCO 3474). 
EFTA includes Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. New EU are the new countries joining EU in 2004: 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria. 
Source: Definition and Production of Harmonized Statistics on Culture in Europe, Chapter 1: 
Employment in cultural occupations (2002), Eurostat, February 2004. 
 
  Benhamou (2000) empirically explains growth in employment in the audiovisual and performing 
arts for France and Great Britain during 1981-92. The two main explanatory factors are a growing 
number of people with cultural occupations working in cultural industries and structural changes in the 
labour market (more flexibility, fragmentation of work opportunities). The Enterprise Allowance Scheme 
contributed to higher self-employment in Britain while the specific social security benefits for artists led 
to higher temporary employment in France. As more comparative data become available from Eurostat, 
more research on shifts in cultural employment in Europe will be possible. 
 
2.2 Public cultural expenditures in Europe 
Throsby (1994) suggests that public cultural expenditures varied from 0.02 per cent of GDP for the US to 
0.14 per cent for the UK and 0.21 per cent for Germany. Little reliable data for Europe exist, however, on 
a comparable basis. Preliminary indicators on total gross public cultural expenditures have been 
published for Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Per capita public 
cultural expenditures are highest in France (180 euro), Austria (179 euro) and the Netherlands (174 euro). 
For most EU countries it is hard to distinguish between gross and net cultural expenditures and between 
current and capital expenditures. It is difficult to single out receipts earmarked for cultural sectors and to 
avoid double counting transfers to lower levels of government. The reliability of figures on cultural 
expenditures at municipal and local levels is further hampered by classification problems. Table 4 
presents national, regional and local public cultural spending for three European countries, namely 
Finland, the Netherlands and Spain. The data are not comparable and there are considerable data gaps and 
badly covered areas. Finnish data excludes subsidies for public broadcasting, but Dutch data includes 
these subsidies. The data exclude cultural subsidies from other ministries than the ministry of culture and 
media, contributions from government regulated sponsors such as national lotteries, and tax subsidies for 
maintenance of monumental buildings, encouragement of risk capital for film ventures, purchase of     
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works by living visual artists, etcetera. 
 
Table 4: National, regional and local public cultural spending 
     Finland 2000     Netherlands, 1999 
Million euros  Central  Local  Total  State  Provinces  Towns  Total 
Heritage  73.0  41.9 114.9 167.4  50.8  221.0 439.2 
Archives 14.5  -  14.5  2.9  0.5  52.2  55.6 
Libraries 182.6  128.6  311.2  23.5  28.1  343.1  394.7 
Books & press  20.4  -  20.4  18.8  -  -  18.8 
Visual arts  9.4  -  9.4  58.0  19.1  42.2  119.3 
Architecture 1.7  -  1.7  7.6  -  -  7.6 
Performing arts  82.1  73.8  155.9  167.0  12.7  64.9  244.6 
Audio/visual/multi-
media 
13.5 - 13.5  904.7  70.3 5.9  980.9 
Interdisciplinary  90.0  97.6 187.5 34.7  10.4  443.3 488.5 
Total 482.5  341.4  823.9  1384.5  191.9  1172.6  2749.0 
 
Spain 
Million euros  Central 1999  Regional 1999  Local 1996 
Heritage 215.7  301.9  65.0 
Archives&libraries 67.2  123.5  - 
Reading&publications 8.3  -  - 
Music, theatre, cinema  127.5  -  - 
Promotion-dissemination 73.8  316.1  512.3 
Cooperation-promotion 
abroad 
49.2 -  - 
Administration&services 19.9  117.2  - 
Total 561.6  858.8  577.3 
 
Key: Finnish data only refer to current expenditures, but Dutch and Spanish data do include capital 
cultural expenditures. 
Source: Task Force on Cultural Expenditure and Finance, Eurostat, October 2002. 
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  Data collection also suffers from organisational problems, lack of a systematic framework and 
changes in accounting conventions. Still, the data suggest that it is wrong to focus attention on cultural 
spending by national governments alone. In Finland, the Netherlands and Spain they make up only 58.6 
per cent, 50.4 per cent (only 32.3 per cent if the public broadcasting bill of 732.5 euro is excluded) and 
less than 28 percent, respectively of total public cultural spending. Cultural spending by the 
regions/provinces and the municipalities is thus very important. In Germany with almost no federal 
cultural budget this is even more the case. 
  Bille, Hjorth-Andersen and Gregersen (2003) describe the efforts of the Nordic Contact Group for 
Cultural Policy Research to arrive at a joint Nordic common standard. They stress the difficulties in 
defining what is exactly meant by cultural policy. Is it only high subsidised culture? Does it include 
teaching of literature or drawing in primary schools, preservation of heritage or valued added of the pop 
music industry? Apart from libraries and newspapers the Group did not arrive at a common standard for 
data classification. The Group includes public spending on the creative arts, theatre, music & dance, film 
& media, libraries, museum, archives, etc., but excludes public spending on cultural education, radio & 
TV and capital items. With these definitions culture's share of gross domestic product during the last 
quarter of a century has remained practically the same in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
namely 0.5-0.6 per cent. Economic growth thus leads to expansion of cultural budgets. 
  Little has been done to explain public cultural expenditures from a macroeconomic or political 
economy perspective as done for general government spending by, for example, Alesina and Perotti 
(1995). Previous studies do explain spending on particular forms of culture. For example, Krebs and 
Pommerehne (1995) empirically study political and other determinants of public support for the 
performing arts. Schulze and Rose (1998) study funding of the ‘Kulturorchester’ in the various regions of 
Germany. Orchestras are heavily funded in Germany: 94.6 per cent of public subsidy comes from local 
communities or municipalities and more than eighty per cent of orchestra funding (compared to 4 per 
cent for the US and 20 per cent for Japan) comes from direct public subsidies. Germany has a very high 
density of orchestras (1 for every 0.6 million citizens) compared with Great Britain (one for every 4 
million citizens) and the US (one for every 1.6 million citizens). Local politicians and local circumstances 
play a key role and decentralisation of culture is even anchored in the German constitution. Schulze and 
Rose find that regional public funding of orchestras in Germany increases with the size of the population 
in the Länder. Larger towns also have bigger orchestras, but a bigger fraction of higher educated people 
surprisingly had no effect on German funding of orchestras. The level of orchestra support depends 
positively on the size of the overall and the cultural budget and negatively on the level of public debt. 
Schulze and Rose also find that conservative and liberal politicians tend to support classical orchestras 
more than Social Democratic and Green politicians do.     
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  Getzner (2002) econometrically analyse determinants of total public cultural spending in Austria 
during 1967-1998. He finds that cultural spending, gross domestic product and the relative price indices 
of gross domestic product and government spending are co-integrated. The ratio of cultural spending to 
gross domestic product may vary in the short run, but rises steadily with gross domestic product. Cultural 
goods seem to have income elasticities greater than one, which lends support for Wagner’s law of ‘the 
growth of state activities’ as described in Peacock and Scott (2000) and Frey (2000). Public cultural 
spending also rises with the price index of government spending (which is evidence for Baumol’s cost 
disease). The relative importance of cultural spending thus grows over time as the national income grows. 
In contrast to Schulze and Rose (1998), cultural spending in Austria thus seems relatively unaffected by 
the ideology of the ruling political parties or by ‘wars of attrition’ between political parties described by 
Alesina and Drazen (1991). As new comparative data becomes available, comparative econometric 
studies into the determinants of cultural spending in Europe become feasible. 
 
Table 5: Cultural subsidies per visit and box office receipts in the Netherlands 
 
Performing arts and museums 
(number of institutions) 
Subsidy per visit 
(average 1994-1997) 
Proportion box office 
receipts to subsidy in 1997 
Dance (12)    48 euro    18:82 
Symphony orchestra's (10)    41 euro    24:76 
Baroque orchestra's (4)    3 euro    82:18 
Musical ensembles (17)    16 euro    36:64 
Opera (3)    120 euro    22:78 
Operette (1)    40 euro    22:78 
Theatre (27)    49 euro    14:86 
Youth theatre (13)    25 euro    18:82 
Mime (6)    41 euro    14:86 
Puppet theatre (4)    12 euro    37:63 
Scientific musea (4)    56 euro    3:97 
Arts musea (4)    7 euro    30:70 
Culture historical musea (15)    13 euro    19:81 
 
Source: van der Ploeg (1999). 
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Public spending on culture contrasts with income from box office and sponsors. For example, Table 5 
relates art subsidies in the Netherlands to box office receipts. The state subsidises every opera seat (not 
counting contributions to costs of concert hall and orchestra) on average by 120 euro. Dance needs less, 
48 euro. Theatre seats receive an average subsidy of 49 euro; seats in concert halls receive 41 euro. Each 
museum visit is subsidised to the tune of 11 euro, a lot less. More accessible forms of culture need fewer 
subsidies than more elitist cultural expressions. Orchestras that play popular music of the 18
tt century, 
Baroque orchestras and operettas thus need less support than opera or symphony orchestras. Paintings of 
Van Gogh are loved throughout the world, so the Van Gogh Museum needs fewer subsidies per visit than 
other museums. Each cultural organisation must obtain at least 15 per cent of revenues from box office or 
sponsors. This is considered a tough requirement by many in the cultural sector. It is important to 
compare subsidies per visit and percentage box office receipts on a thorough basis for the different 
regions and countries of Europe and for the different types of cultural activities. Unfortunately, this 
awaits systematic data collection on a comparable basis. 
 
2.3 Size of creative sectors in Europe 
DCMS (2001) suggests that the share of creative industries in the UK gross domestic product is about 5 
per cent, while employing 1.3 million people. García, Fernández and Zofío (2003) present statistics of the 
contribution of creative cultural and leisure industries to employment and national income for the centre, 
sectors and regions of Spain. They find that they contribute about 4.5 per cent of the gross national 
product and give work to 7.8 per cent of Spanish employees of which only a tiny fraction relates to 
publicly financed culture. About 70 per cent of value added is taken up by the performing, musical and 
audiovisual arts and publishing and printing. Most of it is concentrated in Madrid and Catalonia. 
Collection of employment and income data on the creative industries at a European, national and regional 
level on a systematic basis deserves high priority. In contrast to many other sectors of economic 
importance, no such systematic base of comparable data exists. It is thus difficult to conduct comparative 
research on the effects of the cultural sectors on the creative industries of Europe. 
 
2.4 Cultural participation in Europe 
The Euro-barometer surveys ‘Europeans’ Participation in Cultural Activities in 2001’ (EU15) and ‘New 
Europeans and Culture in 2003’ (2004 EU members plus Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) give a rough 
comparison of cultural participation in Europe. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands seem to be 
ahead in use of PC’s and Internet, while southern and East-European countries lag behind. The people of 
Nordic and Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands read more books and newspapers 
than the EU-average. Reading in Mediterranean and Eastern-European countries is below the EU-    
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average. A similar picture emerges for visits to cultural institutions and artistic activities. It will be 
interesting to study the influence of variables such as education level, age and gender on participation 
once Eurostat makes these data available. In the mean time SCP (2001) offers a partial comparison of 
participation in various cultural activities based on national surveys in nine European countries – see 
Table 6 and Bína (2003).  In all countries the less educated show less interest in traditional forms of 
culture and popular culture (e.g., pop concerts). Culture interest does not depend so much on whether it is 
high or low culture, but on whether the participant is better educated or not. This suggests that cultural 
education at young ages may overcome some of the inequality gap in cultural interest and cultural 
participation. The decline of interest for traditional culture particularly affects young people in the 
Netherlands, even though the rise in educational levels is similar to elsewhere in Europe. We need 
Eurostat comparative data on cultural participation before such judgements can be made more firmly. 
 
Table 6: Cultural participation in eight European countries 
 
  Classical concert    Pop concert      Museum    Theatre 
 All  young  LE  all  Young  LE all  young  LE all  Youn
g 
LE 
Netherlands  16  8  9 25 38 12  31 26 17  27 25 15 
Belgium  31 46 14  27 59 19  48 50 33  49 50 32 
France  9  6  5 16  ..  .. 32 39 24  39 35 31 
GB  13  7  9 18 46 15  32 32 25  39 35 31 
Denmark 16  .. ..  .. .. ..  55  .. ..  26  .. .. 
Finland  11 10  3 12 37  8 43 49 34  38 36 30 
Italy  10 10  5 19 39 12  29 35 18  18 20  8 
Spain  7  8  .. 10 17  7 28 41  .. 14 18  6 
 
Key: Percentages of those 15-75 years of age that visited a classical concert, pop concert, museum or 
theatre during the past twelve months with differentiation for young people in the age group 15-24 and 
the less educated in the bottom tertile (LE) in the 1990’s. 
Source: Bína (2003). 
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2.5 Museum data for Europe 
The European Group on Museum Statistics (EGMUS) collects available data on museums in Europe. 
Since national museum surveys are conducted in very different manners, present data are not comparable. 
To guarantee comparability at the European level, EGMUS has designed a common core of questions to 
be inserted in or extracted from national surveys. Some partial comparisons can be deduced from the data 
presented in Table 7. For example, Norway and Sweden have a large number of visits per 1,000 
inhabitants, followed by the Netherlands, the UK Germany, France and Spain. Citizens of Italy, Portugal, 
Luxemburg, Latvia and Romania visit museums rather less than elsewhere. Museums throughout Europe 
often have free admissions and entry fees make up only a relatively small fraction of total museum 
income. Most countries have many public and private museums varying from art, archaeology, history, 
ethnology and science & technology museums. The Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden and Finland, 
Latvia and the UK have a relatively high percentage of the population that has visited a museum while 
museum participation is below average in France, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
 
Table 7: Museum statistics for Europe 2003 
 Number  #visits  %free  Income  Entry  fees  Staff  Participation 
FI 201  91 37 19.6  8.7  1,590  37 
FR   111      23 
GE  2,729  121      33 
IT 384  52 47 81.0      28 
LA   62     1,735  59 
LU  26 43 24 6.0    223  32 
NL  541  130  30  414.4 56.9  8,935 32 
NO 146 183 46  236.9  18.9    45 
PR 218  59        2,648  16 
RO  519  7       
SL 102  72 23 17.1  2.1 2,292   
SP 878  106  56     10,951  22 
SW 184 185 43  327.6  30.7    52 
UK 1,102  127   491.0    16,777  42 
 
Key: Number (of museums opened at least 200 days a year), #visits (visits per 1,000 inhabitants), %free 
(percentage of free admissions of total visits), income and entry fees (millions euro), and participation 
(percentage of population of 14 years and older have visited a museum in 1994. #visits for Germany is 
excluding free entries and for the UK is based on visits to 1,182 out of 1,850 responding museums. 
Data available for Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LA), Luxemburg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PR), Romania (RO), Slovak Republic (SL), Spain (SP), 
Sweden (SW) and UK. 
Source: EGMUS, Museum Statistics 2003, Eurostat; participation data from Eurobarometer 2001. 
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3. Cultural activities and goods 
3.1. Special features 
Cultural experiences can be aesthetic, touching, memorable and mind baffling. They may even make 
people think differently about themselves, life or the world. In contrast, instant entertainment may be fun 
but the touching and baffling effects fade away quickly. Cultural experiences are also normal economic 
goods with substitutes (sport, family dinners) and complements (newspapers, magazines, transport, etc.). 
Some cultural goods such as pay-TV and visits to the performing arts or museums are rival goods. One 
can then internalise all benefits, so prices reflect true costs and the market functions. If congestion costs 
are large, non-rival may turn into rival cultural goods. For example, noisy, uninterested people attending 
an open-air concert destroy enjoyment of interested art lovers. Classic examples where the marginal cost 
of adding one more consumer is zero are bridges and lighthouses, but broadcasts of radio or TV and 
monumental buildings can also be non-rival. Though jamming can exclude people from broadcasts, it 
does not make economic sense. Non-rival goods thus lead to free riders as nobody wants to pay. This 
may justify subsidies for open-channel radio and television and maintaining heritage. 
  Maddison and Foster (2003) argue that free admissions for the British Museum are harmful due to 
congestion, especially as exhibits are unique and not reproducible. Using valuation data before realisation 
of the Great Court by Norman Foster, they estimate that the congestion cost imposed by the marginal 
visitor to the British Museum is eight pounds. This seems high, since as one should also add other 
marginal costs of admission (security, maintenance, cleaning, etc.). The pure public good case for 
museums is thus hard to make. Some rival goods suffer from non-excludability, since it is not feasible to 
exclude those who do not pay. Think of restoration of a monumental building or a splendid architectural 
design, witness the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao designed by Frank Gehry or the Centre Beaubourg 
designed by Renzo Piano and Richard Rogers and its impact on the depressed Les Halles area of Paris. 
Clearly, passers-by cannot be asked a fee. Due to free-rider behaviour, the market tends to under-provide 
cultural goods that are non-rival and/or non-excludable. Still, a flourishing cultural climate may pull in 
tourism, scarce knowledge workers and new business. The key challenge is to empirically measure these 
external effects. For example, the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra and relocation of part of the 
Royal Ballet to Birmingham have boosted the economic impact of building the largest trade fair of 
Britain. De Swaan (2001) argues that language is a public good. More people that read, write and 
understand the same language imply larger benefits of learning that language for any person. The public-
good character of language may justify support for drama, literature and film, which would otherwise be 
considered excludable, private goods. 
  Rapid technological changes change the nature of cultural goods. In the past one could record fine 
classical music on a cassette from radio or a record, but quality was not perfect. Today one gets their     
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favourite music from Napster-like sites. The quality is very good. CD's are rapidly changing from rival 
(private) to non-rival (public) goods. Music companies find it tougher to make profits and may invest less 
in CD's. Extra income from concerts, books, interviews, merchandise and other related activities will 
become more important. Technological advances but also the Internet, globalisation of the arts market 
and Baumol’s cost disease all contribute to a shift from unique, autographic art to reproductive, 
allographic art. The trend towards specialisation and division of labour implies that artists make designs 
and others produce, reproduce and distribute the art object to the public at large. Examples are books, 
CD's, records, lithographs, posters, photographs, DVD’s, CD-ROMS and pay-per-view TV. This shift 
has lowered prices and increased accessibility of classical and contemporary art for large sections of 
society. This even true for expositions of unique art objects (think of the international Vermeer and Van 
Gogh expositions). Similarly, there has been a shift from physical cultural experiences to the Internet, 
witness the growing number of websites of libraries, museums, archives and performing arts companies. 
The latter can be reproduced at any time and any place in the world at almost no cost. Just like the extra 
demand for DVD's has not undermined demand for cinema, and free virtual cultural expressions on 
Internet do not seem to erode demand for seeing physical displays of culture. Finally, there has been a 
shift from autonomous, more subsidised to applied, more commercial arts such as fashion or design. 
Applied artists typically prefer empowerment to income support, so credit for tools or risk capital. 
  Some culture is produced under increasing returns to scale and winner-takes-all markets. Harris 
and Vickers (1985) show that there is over-investment in new technologies if different firms race to be 
the first to get the patent. This happens if firms race to set a common standard. For example, Phillips lost 
the race for a new DVD standard. If patent markets work badly, there is under-production of cultural 
goods. In the Internet age it is harder to protect property rights on creative expressions and this may 
discourage artists to produce. Rengers and Plug (2001) build on Throsby (1996) and estimate a joint 
model of the choice of visual artists to opt for subsidies (43 per cent) or market funding (57 per cent of 
total market value) and the related earnings. They show that subsidising the visual arts through grants and 
commissions enhances the winner-takes-all tendency for the market at large. They find that financial 
success on private and public markets depends more on personal characteristics, government recognition 
and (unobserved) talents than human capital. The winner-takes-all feature implies that subsidies reinforce 
market preferences, so some artists do well in both public and private markets. 
  High culture differs from instant entertainment. First, culture is an acquired taste. To understand 
and appreciate Oedipus Rex by Stravinsky requires musical knowledge and experience of more 
traditional symphony music and opera's. Surveys suggest that young persons who go to opera are more 
receptive to radical or modern performances of Peter Sellars, Pierre Audi or José María Cano than older 
audiences. Still, Heilbrun (1993) suggests that programming of operas is more conservative than of     
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symphony concerts. Furthermore, innovation in composition of serious music has not been attractive and 
exciting enough to maintain audiences. Preferences for cultural preferences are not given, but shaped by 
education and experience. Rather than saturation described by Gossen's second law of diminishing 
marginal utility, cultural goods show over time increasing marginal utility. The hundredth literary book 
one reads gives more satisfaction than any of the previous books, since the frame of reference will be 
bigger. The latest concert of Bach music impresses more than previous ones, since one gradually 
discovers the unifying themes in Bach's oeuvre. Second, culture is a memorable experience. Experiencing 
a Hamlet at a young age can lead to lifelong memories. 
  Bourdieau (1979) argues that high culture has snob appeal. When the rest starts appreciating some 
high culture, the elite looses interest and moves on to other forms of high culture. It is akin to the theory 
of clubs where the utility of culture falls if more people enjoy them. Baumol and Bowen (1966) noted 
that audiences for the performing arts in the US and UK consist mainly of middle-aged people, 
professionals, managers and white-collar workers with high education and high incomes. Throsby and 
Whithers (1979) find similar profiles for US and Australian audiences. SCP (2000) finds for the 
Netherlands a diminishing interest for classical art of people between 16 and 40 years and growing 
interest among older people. Ethnic minorities with the exception of people from the Dutch Indies 
participate less than average in the arts. Prieto-Rodríquez and Fernández-Blanco (2000) use the Spanish 
Structure, Conscience and Class Biography 1991 Survey to estimate a bivariate probit model to 
characterise the average profile of audiences for classical and popular music. Half were popular music 
followers and only a quarter were classical music fans. Interestingly, the hypothesis that classical and 
popular music fans belong to independent groups is rejected. Controlling for effects of socioeconomic 
characteristics (sex, marital status, number of children, household responsibilities, education and whether 
one is student, pensioner, unemployed, housewife or employee), both groups seem to have an ‘innate’ 
taste for music. This suggests that music lovers are ‘omnivores’ who enjoy classical and popular music. 
No effects of gender or marital status were detected, but age has a negative, nonlinear effect on listening 
to popular music. Classical music listening has a significant positive effect only for young adults (30-45 
years). Education, cultural backgrounds of parents and occupational status have strong positive effects on 
classical music listening, but not on popular music listening. Controlling for all other factors, pensioners 
and housewives listen on average more to classical music, perhaps because their opportunity cost of time 
is less. Finally, listening to popular or classical music is an urban phenomenon, more in Madrid and 
Barcelona than in Andalucia or Galicia. Sintas and Álvarez (2002) analyse social consumption of culture 
by Spanish people using both Bourdieu’s ‘distinction hypothesis’ and Lancaster’s (1966) theory of 
characteristics of products. They conclude that culture in Spain has symbolic value associated with social 
class and allows people to express and distinguish themselves. Still, the rising education level since the     
 
17
Civil War has not increased consumption of high culture proportionally. Of course, high culture may be a 
luxury good. If this effect is strong enough, high culture is a Giffen good so higher prices induce higher 
demand – e.g., Urratiaguer (2002). 
  Even if a minority values high culture, the government may wish to stimulate that the majority has 
an interest in it. Such paternalism overrules consumer sovereignty. However, Bille (1997) shows that the 
Danish public is willing to pay at least as much as the Royal Theatre in Copenhagen receives in public 
subsidies, even though the visitors comprise only 7 per cent of the population and are richer and better 
educated. The willingness to pay of non-users of the Royal Theatre comprises the biggest part of total 
willingness to pay, namely 82 per cent. She estimates total consumer surplus for visits at the theatre to be 
only 15 per cent of public grants to the theatre, so government subsidies must be justified on basis of non-
market benefits of the Royal Theatre. Many people are happy to support the arts even if they do not visit 
themselves. There is no need for paternalism, since people attach option or other values to performing 
arts, like to read critical reviews or watch recordings of performances, value the derived benefits for 
television, the film industry, cultural education, cultural heritage and traditions, and cherish the 
international prestige. See also Frey and Pommerehne (1989). 
  People have many demands on their time, so it is difficult to fit in theatre, opera, concerts or 
museums. The full cost thus corresponds to the cost of entrance plus travel costs and foregone after-tax 
wage income. High-wage earners face a higher cost of cultural events than low-wage earners. Hence, 
higher wages may induce lower demand even if high culture is a luxury good. Since the entrance fee is 
only part of total cost, the elasticity of demand with respect to the entrance fee will be lower especially 
for higher incomes. This offers scope for price discrimination. 
 
3.2. Value of culture 
Throsby (2001) explains the aesthetic, decorative, spiritual, social identity, historical, symbolic and 
authenticity value of art. Art also has use, exchange, store, status, option or bequest value. Defenders of 
culture accuse economists of equating the value of arts to the price, but apart from the marginal consumer 
people pay less than they are willing to pay. The difference added over all consumers is the consumer 
surplus value. Similarly, all producers except the marginal one are willing to supply below the market 
price and the difference is the producer surplus. Under perfect competition profits are zero and welfare 
consumer plus producer surplus. Monopolies raise prices above marginal costs (especially is demand is 
not very elastic) and restrict the volume of trade. If profits are distributed to households, the loss in 
welfare corresponds to the familiar welfare loss triangles. The welfare costs are high if demand and 
supply are inelastic with respect to prices. The chances of a cultural product being put into market are 
higher under monopoly than under perfect competition, since profits are then more likely to cover fixed     
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costs. Tullock (1980) argues that profits are not handed back to consumers, and should be added to the 
social costs of monopoly. Producers lobby to get and maintain a monopoly. They continue with wasteful 
rent seeking until they have dissipated all monopoly profits. True cost of the monopoly is  then the 
welfare loss triangles plus wasted profits. 
  Some argue that the value of arts is (like human life) infinite. Rembrandt's Night Watch is 
priceless, but people have tried to vandalise it. By paying for security one reduces the chance of attack by 
vandals. From that one can infer a value of the Night Watch. Noonan (2003) offers an instructive meta-
analysis of many empirical contingent valuation studies of willingness to pay for cultural goods as local 
TV, opera and UNESCO World Heritage Sites. On the latter Maddison and Mourato (2001) study 
willingness to pay for Stonehenge and Carson et al. (2002) do the same for the Fés Medina. 
  Arts Councils are often asked to use `quality' as the prime criteria. But who decides what `quality' 
is? Is it artists themselves, expert members of an arts council, art critics or the public? Is culture the 
Western canon of established high culture or the culture offered by newcomers and other civilisations? Is 
`quality' high culture or dumbed-down culture? Does quality only become meaningful in the 
confrontation with a public? Obviously, one must safeguard established arts, but also support innovative 
art forms and art for the masses. High culture for selected audiences is valuable, but also low culture for 
mass audiences. The optimal level of quality requires the marginal cost to equal marginal benefit of 
quality. Maximum quality occurs where government ensures zero marginal cost of extra quality, but that 
is not necessarily socially optimal. Critics argue that productions should be executed at the highest 
possible level, particularly if it is paid for by the tax payer. 
  Stocks of cultural goods need an intertemporal approach to value. A crude estimate by directors of 
Dutch museums of the market value of their collections was - depending on the current prices of Van 
Gogh paintings - 20 billion euro. Roughly 5 per cent of museum assets is on display. The rest is in 
storage. Nevertheless, museums strive for bigger collections and buildings. Bookkeeping of museums 
ignores the opportunity cost of their collections in their accounts. Museums act as if their collection, their 
most important production factor, is almost free. Hotelling's arbitrage principle for exhaustible resources 
suggests that one is indifferent between selling the assets and investing the proceeds and keeping and 
displaying, loaning or storing the collection: 
 
expected net gains in the value of the collection plus 
net gains from exhibiting the collection on a permanent or temporary basis plus 
returns from loaning the collection to other museums, companies or the public plus 
gifts from sponsors, donors and friends to help with purchase of new items and exposition minus 
cost of storage minus     
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rate of depreciation and wear and tear of the collection EQUALS 
opportunity rate of return (the market rate of interest) minus 
subsidies for the collection from local or national governments. 
 
If there is an interested and fee-paying public, it may pay to exhibit items. Otherwise, it may be better to 
store them. Since curators have a strong incentive to use funds on storage and research, Frey (2000, 
Chapter 3) argues for increasing incentives for collection mobility (nice for regional museums with lesser 
collections), regulated sales of objects and exhibitions. The opportunity costs, roughly 1 billion euro at a 
5 per cent interest rate, are much larger than the subsidies museums receive, yet they do not feature in the 
cost-benefit analysis of museums, so there is little incentive to make use of valuable collections. Making 
these costs transparent improves the management of museums. This highlights a potential conflict of 
interest between curators who want to study and protect, and exposition managers and the public who 
want the collections to be on display. Grammp (1989) notes that the public prefers to see less pictures on 
a given wall area and enjoys smaller museums relatively more. 
 
4. Valid and invalid arguments for subsidising culture 
4.1 Convincing arguments 
First, there is a strong case to invest in cultural awareness and cultural education of children, especially 
for developing a taste for cultural experience goods that leave a lasting impression rather than instant 
entertainment. It is important not to force high culture upon school children, but let them have a say in 
what they want to enjoy and discuss. One possibility is to give vouchers, so children can go each year 
four to six times a year to a museum, film, theatre play, dance performance, concert or opera. National 
and local governments in Europe give cultural organisations special subsidies for developing special 
activities for young people. For many children cultural education is their only chance to develop an 
awareness of and taste for high culture. The main rationale for subsidising cultural education is that 
culture is an acquired taste and an investment in the future social stock of cultural capital. 
  Second, as subsidised high culture is primarily enjoyed by an older, greying, white, higher 
educated part of the population, there is a case for bringing high culture to the people. By bringing high 
culture to public parks, pop temples, libraries, community halls, shopping precincts, etc., one can reach 
out to new and more diverse audiences. The action plans of central and local governments of the UK and 
the Netherlands allow for interesting experiences in the twilight zone between high and low culture. 
Think of serious theatre and ballet at pop festivals, school children rapping with symphony orchestras, 
pop artists from immigrant countries backed up by symphony orchestras, staging Wagner's Ring in 
central parks, poetry on billboards, break-dancers working with professional dancers, etc. These action     
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plans force the arts to make their output more of a non-rival, non-excludable good and less of a luxury 
good, so there may be a case for government subsidy. 
  Third, there often is a case for stimulating demand rather than supply of cultural goods. For 
example, the Netherlands has shifted from income support for artists to interest subsidies for buyers of 
contemporary visual art. Artistic Programming Funds may encourage provincial venues to program more 
adventurous avant-garde culture. It takes time to cultivate an audience. Also, it is worthwhile to have a 
longer run for successful productions. Giving a `bums on seats' premium to the performing arts gives 
better incentives for drawing bigger audiences and generating income from the market. 
  Fourth, non-rival and/or non-excludable cultural goods are public goods. The market fails to 
deliver the socially optimal level of these cultural public goods. Hence, government should step in to 
ensure that these cultural goods are delivered through the use of subsidies, tax incentives, regulation or 
public sector provision. Samuelson's well known principle of optimal provision corresponds to setting the 
sum of the marginal benefits of the cultural goods across the population equal to the marginal cost. A 
related argument is that cultural goods generate social cultural capital and positive externalities, so they 
benefit society at large and not only the few who consume them. Hence, the government needs to 
subsidise these cultural goods according to the rule of Atkinson and Stern (1974): 
 
sum of marginal benefits of culture to all people in society equals 
relative price of cultural goods times 
marginal cost of public funds minus 
effects of cultural goods on the tax base. 
 
The well-known Samuelson rule states that the sum of the marginal benefits of cultural goods converted 
into resource units must equal the relative price of cultural goods. This is modified in two ways. On the 
one hand, the cost of these public goods is raised as they have to be financed by distortionary taxes. This 
extra cost is particularly high if the wage elasticity of labour supply is high and pre-existing tax 
distortions (e.g., the tax rate on labour) are high. On the other hand, making cultural goods more widely 
available may make people enjoy them more and work less hard and pay fewer taxes. This erosion of the 
tax base raises the cost of public goods. More likely is that more cultural goods attracts more high-skilled 
workers, businesses and tourists and thus raises tax revenues. Obviously, this lowers the marginal cost of 
public goods. In sum, the demand for public cultural goods relative to private goods is large if the costs 
of cultural goods is low (e.g., due to supply subsidies or tax facilities), the marginal cost of public funds 
is low (i.e., if labour supply is inelastic and the tax rate on labour is low), and cultural goods have a 
positive impact on economic activity.     
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  In some European countries the government relies on the advice of the experts of the Arts Council 
when allocating subsidies. A danger is that there is a bias in favour of the established cultural 
organisations, hence it is important to ask the Arts Council or the Arts Fund to make room for new 
cultural initiatives and to support applications that appeal to broader audiences and, if possible, new and 
more diverse audiences. An extra requirement is that the performing arts should obtain at least a certain 
percentage of their income from the box office. For example, in the Netherlands cultural organisations 
must obtain at least 15 per cent from outside income. Table 4 shows that this is easily satisfied for the 
well loved classics played by the baroque orchestra's and to a lesser extent by the symphony orchestra's, 
musical ensembles, opera and puppet theatres, but dance, theatre and mime may have difficulty in 
satisfying this requirement. The public pays only a small part of the true cost of the performing arts. 
People may find an opera ticket of 34 euro expensive, but rarely realise that the full cost is 154 euro. 
Similarly, people might pay 8 euro for a theatre ticket without realising that that there is 49 euro subsidy 
on that same ticket. This seems hard to justify, since performing arts are neither non-rival nor non-
excludable and thus do not qualify as public goods unless one relies on the social cultural capital 
argument. In particular, the social value of theatre may derive from keeping the language alive. 
  Fifth, there is a strong case for government subsidy for cultural goods with existence, option or 
intergenerational value, especially if they contribute to the social stock of cultural capital and are shown 
to the public. This applies to subsidising restoration and maintenance of monumental churches, farms, 
castles, bridges, locks and landscape values. It also applies to other heritage such as archives of history, 
photographs, films and performing arts, libraries, museums and archaeological treasures, particularly if 
they are on display to the public. Each of these adds to the social stock of cultural capital and, if they 
deteriorate, harm is done to the welfare of future generations. The option value argument says that, even 
if one never visits certain parts of the country, one does not want the heritage in those parts to go to the 
dogs. Some argue that the opera provides option value and adds to the social stock of capital as well. 
Obviously, this is also true for funding experiment and research & development, especially as 
fundamental innovations in the arts are very difficult to protect and to make money on through patents 
and/or author rights - see the Schumpeterian arguments in Wijnberg (1994, 1995). There is also a strong 
case for government support for architecture, spatial planning and arts objects in public spaces, because 
these clearly add to the social stock of cultural capital and often to civic pride as well. 
  Sixth, failures on the supply side may merit government intervention. Cultural goods industries 
may have difficulties in being set up, so there may be a case for temporary subsidy. This is the infant-
industry argument. Since many poor countries often have a rich and unique cultural tradition in both 
visual and performing arts, there is a case for temporary cultural aid in economic development 
programmes. This may boost tourism, yield foreign currency and act as a lever for sustainable growth -     
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see the World Culture Report, 1998, UNESCO. Tibetan horn players, Balinese dancers and Cape Verdian 
singers have unique selling points, which can be popularised through the global media, modern 
reproduction methods such as CD's and DVD's and life performances. These artists can help brand their 
own country, like the Beatles and Abba did, and thus boost their economies. 
  Finally, the market tends to avoid risk unless high profits are expected. Avant-garde cultural 
activities face bigger credit market constraints than more profitable, run-of-the-mill cultural activities 
(musicals, cabaret, bestsellers, etc.). The government should thus stimulate the provision of risk-bearing 
capital for risky, valuable cultural activities. Government-funded participation companies may help 
getting risk-bearing capital from the market, especially if combined with fiscal incentives. Governments 
can also stimulate cultural investment by granting interest rate incentives for cultural projects. Friends of 
a particular museum or theatre may then be willing to lend money in the form of soft loans.  
 
4.2 Fallacious demand-side arguments for cultural subsidies 
One fallacious argument is that demand for cultural goods depends on their supply and that the 
government should thus subsidise supply. Otherwise, people will never know the value of the supply of 
cultural goods that may never materialise. Without subsidies for the opera, people will never know that, 
say, Gluck's work existed and thus demand will not occur. Still, this does not justify subsidising supply of 
high culture unconditionally. It does suggest a boost to the demand for high culture through cultural 
education, vouchers for parts of the population that normally do not go to expressions of high culture, 
action programmes reaching out to new and more diverse audiences and programming subsidies. 
  Another fallacious argument is that cultural goods should be for equity and efficiency reasons 
affordable to everyone and not only to rich art lovers. The sensible response seems to enforce price 
discrimination (e.g., asking season ticket holders to pay more per seat than those who buy last-minute 
individual tickets). However, the cultural lobby typically argues that one should lower the price for 
everybody by subsidising these cultural goods. This way one reduces the price for everybody, but higher 
incomes profit much more from these subsidies than lower incomes. The dead-weight burden of lump-
sum subsidies for the supply of cultural goods may be very high. It is much more efficient to boost 
demand among lower incomes or children through education, vouchers, action programmes or other 
means. This is an effective way to ensure that people can choose themselves which culture they want to 
experience. If one is concerned about a tendency for middle of the road taste at the expense of avant-
garde culture and niches of high culture, teachers and programmers of venues might try to gently 
cultivate a taste for experience goods. Supply subsidies allocated by committees of experts typically 
stimulate high culture for the elite. Although this seems in line with the moral theological ideas of 
Thomas Aquinas that the prominence of someone's position in the community should imply a larger     
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share of the common goods, this medieval view is hardly endorsed anymore. 
  Yet another fallacious demand-side argument is that price increases lead to even bigger falls in 
demand and thus to fall in revenues, hence supply subsidies must be given. This is unconvincing, since 
demand for cultural products is often inelastic so raising prices does raise revenues. If this means that 
concert halls, theatres etc. are not fully utilised, there is a better case for boosting demand rather than 
supply for concerts, theatre etc. Finally, a popular argument for granting government subsidy is that 
cultural goods are merit goods. If society demands an insufficient amount of these goods even though it 
can afford them, the government should subsidise them. Although this paternalistic argument may justify 
subsidising cultural education, it does not convince for across-the-board cultural subsidies. 
 
4.3 Unconvincing supply-side arguments 
Some argue that cultural goods are produced under decreasing average costs, so subsidy is needed to 
ensure full utilisation of concert halls, theatres, museums etc. and ensure that operations are profitable. 
This argument is pretty unconvincing. If these venues do not pull in audiences, they can experiment with 
cheap last-minute tickets and spend more time and effort on marketing. This phenomenon provides a case 
for stimulating demand through education, vouchers, action plans and programming subsidies, not for 
extra supply subsidies. Another unconvincing argument is that culture contributes to employment. In an 
economy with a tight labour market, this is a fake argument and has nothing to do with market failure. 
The freedom to educate oneself as an artist does not oblige the government to provide for enough 
orchestra's, theatre companies, etc. in order to employ all art graduates. The employment argument may 
be valid for certain professions (e.g., restoration) if one fears that otherwise valuable skills will be lost for 
future generations. The fact that many artists are poor is not a valid argument either, because it makes 
more sense to subsidise all people that are poor regardless of their occupation. 
  The most cited and at the same time least understood economic insight by the cultural sector is 
undoubtedly Baumol’s cost disease. It is argued that the performing arts and other cultural goods are 
labour intensive and thus suffer from Baumol's cost disease. Performing Hamlet or Don Giovanni or 
making a sculpture take just as much hours of work as in the time of Shakespeare, Mozart or Rodin. 
Compare that with the huge technological progress during the last few centuries in services and 
manufacturing. Since productivity growth lags behind, the cost and price of these cultural goods rise over 
time unless wages in the arts lag behind wages in the rest of the economy. To make sure demand and the 
provision of these cultural goods do not fall, many argue that government subsidy is required. This is 
unconvincing, since the increase in productivity elsewhere gives rise to huge increases in purchasing 
power. If people value this labour-intensive culture, they will use their new riches to pay for it. With 
Cobb-Douglas preferences, the ratio of output of cultural to other output dwindles away and prices of     
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cultural goods rise at the rate of technical progress in the rest of the economy, but absolute levels of 
employment and output in the cultural sector remain constant. Jobs in the cultural sector are not 
destroyed, since technological progress elsewhere boosts purchasing power just enough to maintain 
spending on culture despite rising prices of culture. There are two unrealistic assumptions in this 
discussion of Baumol's cost disease. First, Cobb-Douglas preferences are homothetic and yield linear 
Engel curves and unit income elasticities. However, food, drink, shelter and health may be necessary 
goods while culture is a luxury good. With Stone-Geary preferences the budget share of the arts rises 
over time, since people give priority to basic needs if they are poor and spend more on culture, as they 
grow richer. Second, the elasticity of substitution between culture and other consumption goods is 
probably less than unity. A CES utility function with an elasticity of substitution less than unity generates 
a budget share of culture that rises over time as well. If demand is inelastic, culture thus generates 
sufficient revenues to compensate for rising costs. Hence, despite rising relative prices of the arts, there 
are good reasons to believe that the budget share of culture rises over time and that arts will flourish. In 
any case, Baumol's cost disease leads to offsetting trends. 
  The rise in the relative price of labour-intensive cultural expressions causes a shift towards less 
labour-intensive culture. A vocal artist may not be accompanied by a symphony orchestra, but by a 
chamber orchestra or even a musical computer whiz kid. Technology may induce new economies of scale 
and substitution in consumption, think of the popularity of the CD, video, DVD and poster as a substitute 
for the concert, film or theatre play and the painting. Opera and theatre producers experience more 
difficulties in keeping up and adjusting than the musical sector. In addition, rising prices induce a shift 
from small-scale to large-scale productions and from unique to reproducible art. The possibilities for an 
artist of operating on a world market have grown enormously with the advent of globalisation and the 
Internet. These developments have led to super incomes for only a few stars - see Rosen (1981) and Frey 
(2000, chapter 4). This applies, for example, to the trio of super-tenors (Pavarotti, Domingo, Carreras). It 
also applies to the museums with the world's most famous paintings on display. Think of the Van Gogh 
Museum in Amsterdam, the Rijksmuseum Amsterdam with Rembrandt's Nightwatch, the Louvre with its 
Mona Lisa or the Prado in Madrid showing the magnificent work of Vélasquez. These museums 
sometimes also enjoy world famous architecture. Think of Frank Lloyd Wright's Guggenheim Museum 
in New York, Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao or Richard Meier's Centre in Los Angeles. 
The economics of superstars suggests that the big stars can raise their incomes substantially, while many 
others loose out. Baumol's cost disease causes a shift from art for the elite to art for the masses. This may 
induce dumbing down at the expense of diversity and experiment. If so, there may be a case for 
subsidising innovation, experiment and diversity in the arts.     
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5. Quality versus popularity 
5.1 Different ways of funding culture in Europe 
There are different systems of supporting the arts, varying from tax incentives, supply subsidies, demand 
subsidies and granting privileged positions possibly in exchange for satisfying certain requirements from 
the government. First, one can grant privileged positions. Public broadcasting organisations in Europe get 
first right when allocating air space for TV and radio on top of a hefty subsidy. In return they offer a 
broad mix of programmes for all and program minimal amounts of information, education, arts and 
culture. Commercial broadcasters in Europe have more freedom. They have more advertising time and 
can interrupt programmes for advertisements. Another example is the fixed book price, where booksellers 
are granted monopoly power for each book that is published - see van der Ploeg (1994). Figure 1a show 
the costs of a granting a privileged position such as the fixed book price agreement: higher prices and 
lower sales. The loss in welfare can be approximated by the sum of the consumer and producer surplus 
triangles. Critics argue that the fixed book price is bad for low incomes and hurts the democracy of 
culture. Others counter by arguing that books are heterogeneous goods, which are produced and sold 
under monopolistic competition. They argue that the agreement allows for cross-subsidies from 
bestsellers towards less popular books and a more diverse supply of book titles and bookshops. This 
cross-subsidy argument is unlikely if bestsellers are highly price elastic and thus permit little monopoly 
power while less popular books are price inelastic and allow a lot of monopoly power. The agreement 
then induces substantial welfare costs. This may happen if bestsellers are easily digestible, require little 
time to read and have higher price elasticities while, say, poetry readings demand a lot of time and thus 
have lower price elasticities. Many granted privileges and other monopoly positions will be undermined 
by technical changes. For example, the fixed book price may be undermined if people order books on the 
Internet through amazon.com and other virtual book suppliers. Hjorth-Andersen (2000) documents how 
the advent of new printing technology and new media have cut costs and led to an avalanche of new book 
titles in the Danish book market. Although it is much easier to get a book published for an author, turn-
round of books has increased enormously and it is much more difficult to attract large groups of readers. 
Digital camera's and recording & editing equipment make low budget radio and TV possible. Internet and 
digital frequencies will abolish ether scarcity. Also, the monopoly of public and commercial broadcasters 
is challenged by the arrival of narrowcasters. 
  Second, the tax system can be used to grant demand or supply subsidies. Figure 1b shows that 
boosting demand through lower VAT, interest-free loans for buying visual arts or tax deductions for 
restoring monuments raises prices of and volume of cultural goods. The volume of cultural goods rises a 
lot if demand and supply are highly elastic. If the demand elasticity is large and the supply elasticity is 
small, there is not much of a change in consumer prices while producer prices fall a lot. Since consumers     
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are weak and producers strong, the benefit of the demand price subsidies are shifted from consumers to 
cultural producers.  
 
Figure 1: Incidence of different types of government intervention in the cultural sector 
(a) Granting monopoly power          (b) Cutting demand taxes or 
          granting  demand  subsidies 
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(c) Cutting supply taxes or giving tax incentives for supply 
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Key: ∆CS and ∆PS refer to the change in the consumer surplus and producer surplus, respectively.     
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If culture takes up a lot of time of the consumer and producers have received volume subsidies to stage a 
certain number of productions, both the price elasticity of market demand and supply are likely to be low. 
As a result, welfare costs are high. Welfare gains from the demand price subsidy, measured by consumer 
and producer surpluses, must be balanced against the welfare costs of raising tax revenues. Figure 1c 
indicates that boosting supply through, for example, tax incentives for producing films lowers prices and 
raises volume. In principle, there is no difference in using demand or supply price subsidies in 
competitive environments. If demand is very inelastic and supply very elastic, most of the benefit of the 
supply price subsidy is shifted to consumers while demand is not boosted very much. In that case, there is 
not much point in supply price subsidies. Although most cultural tax incentives apply across the board, it 
makes sense to avoid dead-weight losses by trying to target these instruments at the most needy projects. 
For example, interest-free loans only apply to living visual artists; film incentives require films to have 
substantial European contents; and deductions for monuments can only be obtained if the property is 
indeed a valuable, historic monument. 
  Third, a subsidy to boost the volume of supply yields lower prices and bigger volume. The positive 
effect on volume is partially offset by the negative effect of lower prices on supply, particularly if the 
demand elasticity is small and the supply elasticity is large. 
 
5.2 Dead-weight losses and substitution 
When giving subsidies, efficiency requires one to avoid dead-weight losses and substitution. This means 
that ideally one subsidises only the marginal buyer or seller but in practice one has to subsidise all other 
buyers and sellers as well (unless one can target the subsidy to the most needy). For example, if one 
wants to help low incomes with cheap opera tickets, one also gives unnecessary subsidies to those 
pundits who can afford the true cost of opera. The welfare losses from these unnecessary subsidies 
(measured by the consumer and producer surplus triangles) are higher if demand and supply are more 
inelastic. One should avoid substitution, so cultural producers should not receive subsidies for activities 
they would have done anyway without subsidy. 
  Demand price and supply price subsidies are equivalent. They are across the board subsidies and 
suffer from dead-weight losses. Supply volume subsidies can be much better targeted at particular needy 
cultural activities and thus cause less dead-weight losses. However, supply volume subsidies are allocated 
by civil servants, committees of experts or others, which cause inefficiencies associated with lobbying 
and rent seeking. The use of committees of experts may also induce a bias for arts for artists and arts for 
the elite, but the extremes of the cultural spectre may benefit. Some therefore have a preference for 
demand subsidies or generic rules that lean with the market. This allows the government to change from 
participant to setting the rules and conditions of the game and ensuring a level playing field among     
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cultural producers. This leads to the danger of median voter outcomes, where middle of the road culture 
is reinforced. For example, Urratiaguer (2002), building on  Throsby (1990) and Abbé-Decarroux (1994), 
finds that quality as judged by experts or drama critics or indicated by the artistic reputation of manager-
directors are poor explanatory variables of the demand for subsidised theatre in France (and finds a 
positive price elasticity). In effect, there is a negative effect of artistic quality on attendances. The main 
factor explaining demand seems to be the reputation of the theatre company. This empirical work for 
France suggests that middle-of-the-road programming and bigger audiences may follow after a shift from 
supply grants to demand incentives. 
 
5.3 Programming diversity and funding of TV 
To formally analyse the effects of financing modes on programming diversity and welfare, a framework 
of monopolistic competition is used. Most of this research has concerned TV. The pioneering 
contribution of Spence and Owen (1977) shows that any private system of finance biases against 
programmes with a low own-price elasticity of demand (‘minority taste programmes’) and that are 
expensive to produce. The price fails to fully reflect the average intensity of preferences for certain 
programmes and, given, fixed costs, such programmes are not produced. This bias occurs with pay-TV, 
but is worse if programmes are financed by advertising revenues. The latter produces fewer programmes 
and leads to a less diverse menu of programmes than pay-TV. As the cross-elasticity of substitution 
among programmes increases, advertising is more likely to approach a second-best structure than pay-
TV. Many countries of Europe have cable-TV. It is important to permit advertising on pay-TV, make 
sure the cable operator allows entry of other suppliers of programmes, and ensure open entry with elastic 
supply of channels. Doyle (1998) extends the analysis and considers various regulatory instruments (e.g., 
direct instructions and a tax on profits) that can be used. Chae and Flores (1998) argue that certain 
characteristics of TV programmes, e.g., the degree of extensiveness of the market, makes them more 
likely to be broadcast than shown on pay-TV. Bourreau (2003) analyses the trade-off between mimicking 
and counter-programming. He shows that profile differentiation is higher under pay-TV than under 
advertising support where competition on price is infeasible. He also shows that programme quality is 
higher under advertiser support than under pay-TV. These studies ask the right questions and they also 
apply to other areas of culture. Of course, in contrast to the US, Europe finances a lot of public 
broadcasting. These studies justify governments doing this if they make possible the production and 
broadcasting of more expensive TV-programmes that cater for special niche audiences. That is something 
the market can only deliver in the form of narrowcasting. To ensure the diversity of programmes of 
public broadcasts, Germany relies on representative viewers’ committees, the UK on detailed programme 
requirements, and the Netherlands on diverse broadcasting corporations corresponding to liberal,     
 
29
catholic, protestant, social-democratic, libertarian, or evangelical pillars. The UK limits the entry of 
commercial broadcasters and forbids the BBC from advertising. In return for monopolistic advertising 
profits Channel 4 and ITV face extensive programming requirements. 
 
6. The arms’ length principle: institutions matter 
Europe has three basic systems of allocating supply volume subsidies. The French and Italian systems are 
top-down and state-driven, so bureaucrats and politicians have a say in who gets subsidy. There are many 
disadvantages. It is not a very transparent system, there is lot of scope for lobbying and friends' politics, 
prestige projects stand a better chance, and state arts has many unpleasant connotations. At the other end 
there is the British system. The Secretary of State allocates a budget to the Arts Council and asks it to 
take responsibility for allocating it to the applicants for cultural subsidy. The UK Arts Council effectively 
operates an independent Art Fund out of reach of democratic checks and balances. It is then hard for the 
British government to set priorities and formulate criteria for allocating subsidies. The British system has 
clear advantages. There is less room for political lobbying and rent seeking and no danger of the state 
trying to impose its taste on the cultural sector. A disadvantage is that the government has little room for 
influencing the direction of cultural policy. 
  An intermediate system relies on an independent Arts Council, which gives experts' advice on 
artistic merit and on how budgets should be allocated. The main difference is that the Arts Council gives 
advice to the government, but it is the Minister of Culture and not the Arts Council that takes the final 
responsibility for the allocation of cultural subsidies. This is the case in, for example, the Netherlands. 
The government operates at arms' length and does not judge the artistic quality of different cultural 
activities and organisations, but relies on experts' advice of the Arts Council. There may be political and 
managerial reasons for deviating from the advice of the Arts Council. The government attempts to set the 
rules of the game including criteria and priorities for applicants for cultural subsidies and the Arts 
Council well in advance. This means that the government announces in a White Paper the framework 
(priorities, criteria and budgets) which the Arts Council needs to adopt. The main advantage of such a 
system is that the government can shape cultural policy without meddling in artistic judgements about 
individual cultural activities and organisations. However, in a system characterised by ministerial 
responsibility, there is maximum scope for political lobbying and rent seeking. Winners get on with 
making theatre, opera, dance or whatever, while losers find plenty of opportunity to make their case in 
the media. This is further reinforced by parliamentarians who want to distinguish themselves by 
associating themselves with the arts. The result is that it is easier to lobby for extra budget for the arts 
than for the sciences where the research councils allocate the subsidies and there is no ministerial 
responsibility. Delegation of cultural tasks to an Arts Fund or the Arts Council is known as the arms’     
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length principle. It is particularly relevant if it concerns judgements about artistic quality. 
  Incentives to sit on committees of the Arts Council are not big. Peers love you until you 
recommend lowering or scrapping subsidy. Subsidy addiction and the public shaming of committee 
members sustain the tyranny of the status quo. It takes much time and effort for committee members to 
do a proper job. Furthermore, it is not certain that one's advice convinces the rest of the committee and 
that the committee's recommendation is followed. If committees are large, one must listen to many 
opinions and it is tough to put a well-argued case. Hence, costs of sitting on committees are high and 
benefits small. Many experts find sitting on these committees a waste of time and effort, stressful and 
even humiliating. Tullock (1971) argues that there is a real danger that meetings are long and dull, suffer 
from comment pollution and members merely proffering personal opinions without attempting to get to 
grips with the issues concerned. To improve matters, it is important to keep committees not larger than 
six of seven members and give them well-specified tasks with clear criteria and priorities. In addition, the 
government should promise to follow the recommendations provided they satisfy the criteria and do 
justice to the priorities set in advance by the government. 
  The government should also follow these principles in order to avoid having to make individual 
tradeoffs between, say, the artistic merits of theatre group A versus those of theatre group B.  The 
government should avoid the accusation of state art. Still, given that funds are scarce, the government 
must set clear criteria and priorities. The cultural sector and art critics often argue that the government 
should not do that: all art is valuable (and deserves subsidy) and the cherished autonomy of the arts is 
often used to keep and demand more subsidies. The government must be careful not to succumb to such 
lobbies, but refrain from making artistic value judgements about individual cultural expressions. The 
pressure from the cultural sector, art critics, the press, voters and parliamentarians to form a positive 
artistic judgement is particularly strong if the Arts Council recommends a subsidy cut. As a result, 
political debate concentrates on the victims and cultural policy tends to be incremental and catering for 
the status quo. Klamer (1996) argues that politicians will loose the rhetoric arguments, since the cultural 
sector including the critics are much better able to make their case. Many observers will support the 
lobby if only to show their cultural love in the spirit of Bourdieu. It is thus crucial that the government 
clearly lays down the rules of the game in advance of the applications for subsidy, because otherwise it 
will succumb to pressure to overthrow negative artistic judgements of the Arts Council. If an organisation 
gets subsidy despite a negative advice, a legal precedent is set and other cultural organisations that do not 
have their subsidies reinstated have a good case in court. 
  Each system for the allocation of cultural subsidies has different perversions. Stimulating demand 
across the board carries little danger of rent seeking and lobbying and avoids protection of the status quo, 
but suffers from dead-weight losses and bias towards middle of the road culture. The French or Italian     
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system suffers from top-down behaviour, lobbying, rent seeking, political and bureaucratic favouritism, 
and a bias towards prestige projects. The British system does not suffer too much from lobbying and rent 
seeking, since it avoids the taste of politicians and bureaucrats to influence individual decisions. Both the 
British and the Dutch system are transparent. The Dutch system allows more room for the government to 
shape cultural policy without trying to influence artistic judgements, but suffers from political lobbying 
and rent seeking. The Dutch government has made a determined effort to give more room for diversity 
and innovation and equal chances for newcomers and establishment. It also has given a clear mission to 
the Arts Council. In any system it is important to keep the cultural sector on the ball by ensuring a 
competitive field with free entry. This requires equal access to cultural subsidies for everybody, but may 
also be helped by vouchers, performance contracts and yard stick competition (benchmarking). It is 
important to stimulate cultural entrepreneurship by defining ends and yardsticks to measure results while 
allowing for the costs of targeting. The government should use the right sticks and carrots and avoid 
destroying intrinsic artistic motivation of artists. Attention should be paid to how to manage cultural 
institutions. Cultural governance is an issue, especially if supervisees of cultural organisations cherish the 
chance to mingle with artists rather than do a proper job. Unfortunately, supervisees are often older white 
men from the banking sector and big business. To be in touch with new and diverse audiences, one must 
look for more representative boards of supervisees. In addition, the guidelines for corporate governance 
can be adapted for the cultural sector and be applied. 
  Recent theories of delegation and control explain whether non-elected bureaucrats or art experts or 
elected politicians should take responsibility for shaping cultural policy and allocating funds to cultural 
organisations and activities. Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) analyse whether public services such as 
prisons should be delegated to private business or under control of politicians. Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1999) discuss the use of advocates for policy makers. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) are 
concerned with career concerns rather than explicit contracts as a motivation of government agencies. 
Maskin and Tirole (2001) study accountable agents with career concerns and non-accountable agents 
with intrinsic motivations. Alesina and Tabellini (2004) build on these contributions to explain whether 
tasks should be given to bureaucrats or politicians. They show that politicians are from a normative 
perspective better suited to particular tasks than bureaucrats if: (1) differences in performances are due to 
effort rather than to individual talent or technical ability; (2) preferences of the electorate and 
parliamentarians are unstable and uncertain, so flexibility is valuable and the task or mission of 
bureaucrats cannot be specified ex ante while politicians are accountable and can ex post be voted out of 
office; (3) time inconsistency is unlikely to apply; (4) politicians cannot strategically distort policy 
choices in favour of short-term objectives at the expense of long-term welfare; (5) the stakes of organised 
interest groups are small and the legal system is poorly designed, so corruption is widespread; and (6)     
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side payments to compensate the losers are desirable and relevant or bundling of policies is crucial to 
obtain majorities in parliament. Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) argue that the degree of delegation is 
chosen so as to maximise the benefit to politicians. Alesina and Tabellini argue that then politicians want 
to keep those tasks that generate substantial rents, campaign contributions and/or bribes and all kinds of 
redistributive tasks. However, Fiorina (1977) points out that politicians are happy to delegate tasks that 
have a high risk of policy failure so that bureaucrats can be blamed. Monetary policy requires 
sophisticated skills, has relatively few distributional effects and suffers from time inconsistency 
problems. Also, the electorate’s preferences for low inflation are stable and not controversial and 
recessions can be blamed on central bankers. As in Rogoff (1985), there is a clear-cut case for delegating 
monetary policy to an independent central bank. Similar arguments apply to regulation of utilities. In 
contrast, foreign policy should not be delegated to bureaucrats as preferences change a lot and it is 
difficult to ex ante specify the goals. Redistributive policy should not be delegated either, since 
politicians may want to capture some of the associated rents.  
  How about delegation of cultural policy? Which tasks in the domain of cultural policy should be 
given to the Minister of Culture, parliamentarians, bureaucrats and art experts? Many of the insights of 
the theory of delegation apply. Politicians are motivated by being popular and winning elections in the 
short run. Bureaucrats at the Ministry of Culture are motivated by career concerns and have a longer-term 
perspective. Art experts are motivated by their standing and reputation with their peers in the cultural 
sector. They also want to be seen to be independent of political pressure. Cultural subsidies generate 
substantial rents. Many politicians like to be seen to be a patron of the arts and around election time are 
happy to call on ‘friends’ in the arts to lend their theatres and call on them for help during the campaign. 
Judging which theatre company deserves subsidy requires sophisticated knowledge and many visits in 
order to judge properly. Since there is also the danger of state art, politicians should stay away from 
judging the merits of individual artistic expressions. They are unsuited to decide on the exact allocation 
of funds. This is better done by bureaucrats who make use of the advice of  expert judgement on artistic 
quality. Many politicians do not resist the temptation to interfere in the allocation of funds to please 
electoral lobbies and engage in redistribution from, say, the rich metropolis to culture-starved regions. 
This is particularly prevalent in a system with ministerial responsibility. There often is huge pressure 
from the parliament to focus at short-term benefits of cultural subsidies with no concern for the long run. 
Building a new theatre or opera house generates short-term prestige, but without making funds available 
for ambitious programming it is unclear whether it will contribute to a thriving cultural climate. The 
making of cultural policy suffers from very serious time inconsistency problems. This should not be 
mistaken for varying or unstable cultural preferences. The normative reasons (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) 
described above thus strongly argue in favour of the arms’ length principle in the making of cultural     
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policy: the allocation of the execution of cultural policy should be delegated to an independent Arts Fund. 
The Minister of Culture can package cultural policies and make side payments to obtain a majority (see 
(6)), but that can be done by the financial and cultural experts of the Arts Council as well. 
  Delegation of the execution of cultural policy to an independent Arts Fund does not deny a role for 
the Minister of Culture. It is crucial that he or she defines a clear, yet broadly-defined mission for the Arts 
Funds. In this White Paper the Minister should state its priorities and criteria and also the available 
budgets. The Minister of Culture should not be allowed to change the rules of the game halfway through 
the complicated process of granting subsidies or to decide on subsidies for individual cultural 
organisations. The Minister of Culture should safeguard that the Arts Fund acts according to the 
objectives stated in the mission and only interfere if the Arts Fund deviates from the mission. The 
mission could state, for example, that more funds should go to cultural education, vouchers, cultural 
diversity, the regions or international cultural policy, but not to which particular cultural organisations 
unless no judgement of artistic quality is involved. Carpenter (2001) argues that the rise of the regulatory 
state offers bureaucrats the chance to decide as well implement legislation. This also applies to Arts 
Councils and Arts Funds. They can count on generous space in the press and are able to obtain support 
for their case. In the absence of a strong and visionary Minister of Culture, there is a danger that the 
Minister of Culture simple rubberstamps the proposals of the Arts Council or Arts Fund. Granting 
cultural subsidies by an Arts Fund, bureaucrats or the Minister of Culture is not the only option. Another 
system is to allocate cultural subsidies by referendum as in Switzerland. Schulze and Ursprung (2000) 
analyse a public referendum for the Zurich Opera House, but governments of the European Union have 
not used referenda in cultural policy. 
 
6.1. An analytical example of delegation of cultural policy 
Output Y is given by the sum of unobservable talent or ability A∼N(AM,σ
2), effort X, and noise ε∼N(0,τ
2), 
that is Y=A+X+ε. Bureaucrats and experts want others to have a good perception of their ability, so their 
reward is E[(E(A/Y)]=AM + β E[A+ε+X-E(X)-AM] where β≡σ
2/(σ
2+τ
2)<1 is the signal-to-noise ratio. If 
costs are convex in effort, i.e., C(X), C′>0, C″>0, the Arts Council chooses effort level X=C′
-1(β) and puts 
in less effort if there is a lot of noise relative to the variance of talent. With imperfect monitoring, 
bureaucrats and art experts put in too little effort which causes a loss of welfare. A Minister of Culture is 
concerned with re-election, so his or her reward is Prob[y>AM+E(X)+ε]. This implies rational voters, 
who assume that the alternative to the incumbent is a politician with average talent and who in 




2)]. Imperfect monitoring (τ>0) reduces effort of both the Arts Council and the Minister 
of Culture. However, more uncertainty about talent boosts effort of the Arts Council and cuts effort of the     
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Minister of Culture.  The Arts Council experts are motivated by career concerns and fully internalise 
benefits of higher expected ability. The Minister of Culture wishes to secure re-election. It follows that 
bureaucrats and art experts are better suited for tasks requiring special abilities or technical competence 
that not everyone (and a Minister of Culture definitely not) is likely to have. They are not more gifted 
than the Minister of Culture, but that they have stronger incentives to be gifted. 
  Assume now perfect monitoring and that cultural policy is concerned with two tasks: facilitating a 
diverse spectrum of cultural activities of high artistic quality (Q) and promoting participation of large and 
diverse audiences (P). The success of achieving these tasks is determined by effort Xi, i=Q,P and ability 
A of the person who makes cultural policy, so Q=A+XQ and P=A+XP. The costs of the efforts of the 
policy maker are additive and convex, C(XQ+XP), C′>0, C″>0. Ex ante the electorate is uncertain about 
whether it prefers more artistic quality or more participation. It has utility U[δQ+(1-δ)P], where δ=1 with 
probability p and δ=0 with probability 1-p. The Minister of Culture formulates in a White Paper the 
mission or task of the Arts Council, say Y≡λQ+(1-λ)P with 0<λ<1, and defends this in parliament before 
asking the Arts Council to use it. The mission of the Arts Council is not contingent on the realisation of 
the preferences of the electorate δ (i.e., it is an incomplete contract) and thus does not follow the whims 
of the voters. The experts on the Arts Council are concerned with the perception of their ability, hence 
their reward is E[(E(A/Y)] = E[A+λXQ+(1-λ) XP -λE(XQ)-(1-λ) E(XP)]. If p>1/2, it is optimal to ask the 
Arts Council to focus completely at artistic quality Q (i.e., λ=1). The optimal strategy, as far as the Arts 
Council is concerned, is to set XP=0 and XQ=C′
-1(1). By giving the Arts Council a fixed mission, society 
is stuck with the risk that they cannot respond if ex post cultural participation is important as well. The 
Minister of Culture can respond to changing preferences (i.e., the realisation of δ) and devotes effort only 
to the task ex post preferred by the electorate. This advantage is not so strong if voters are not too risk 
averse and relative certain about their ex-post preferences. In that case it is best to let the Minister of 
Culture set the mission of the Arts Council.  
 
7. Subsidiarity, local cultural clubs and federalism 
To determine the best level (local, regional, national of international) for the making of cultural policy, 
the well-known subsidiarity principle employed by the European Union is useful. This implies that it is 
best to conduct cultural policy at as low a level of government as possible. Politicians at the local level 
are better informed about preferences of their electorate and can be more readily rewarded and punished 
if they do not take account of them than politicians at a national or international level. However, culture 
thrives best in a competitive climate so it is better to allocate part of the subsidies at a national or 
international level. This ensures that the quality of, say, a local symphony orchestra is judged against 
symphony orchestra in other regions and requires cultural policy at a higher level of government.     
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Another reason for having cultural policy at a national or international level is that much of culture 
generates by its very nature positive cross-border externalities. There may also be substantial economies 
of scale. For example, small countries make do with one big opera house. 
   The theory of local public goods surveyed in Rubinfeld (1987) and Scotchmer (2002) point out the 
importance of migration between local jurisdictions and has obvious applications to the making of a 
cultural policy in Europe and, in particular, to the Länder of Germany. Tiebout (1956) argues that the 
provision of local public goods can be viewed as an efficient competitive market for private goods where 
people reveal their preferences for these public goods by ‘voting with their feet’. Efficiency requires 
perfect information, costless migration, and no cross-border externalities. Efficiency also requires each 
jurisdiction to be large enough, so there are enough people to produce the local public good at minimum 
average cost. Free entry of people is a very strong assumption. However, one does see more skilled and 
educated people migrating to bigger cities (London, Barcelona, Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam) with a 
bigger supply of local cultural goods. Provincial towns get starved of their potential audiences and find it 
more difficult to support high culture. The optimal size of a jurisdiction is indeed small if preferences are 
homogenous for each region, cross-region spill-over effects are small and economies of scale are 
unimportant. The club model of local public good provision trades off economies of scale versus 
externalities arising from congestion. Groups of people with similar incomes and similar preferences 
arrange themselves in a club. The Tiebout model allows citizens to have different incomes and uses a 
local property tax to finance local public goods. Cultural public goods have an impact on land and 
property values. Building a theatre, opera house or museum makes neighbourhoods more attractive 
places to live and attract citizens who pay higher local taxes and push up land and house prices. An 
interesting direction of future research in cultural economics is to analyse the effects of local cultural 
infrastructure and activities on land and house prices and to estimate the demand for these goods in terms 
of local socio-economic characteristics and local and intergovernmental support. Such demand studies 
should focus on different attributes (e.g., international reputation versus popular appeal) of the local 
cultural goods. A crucial complication is how to aggregate preferences, since people differ very much in 
their taste for culture. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) show that under certain strong conditions one can 
postulate a simple majority-rule political process by estimating demand for cultural goods based on a 
median-voter model. Rubinfeld (1987) discusses the empirical aspects of estimating such demand 
functions for local public goods and the Tiebout model in some detail. The use of micro data on cultural 
demand seems particularly promising. 
  An important issue for Europe is whether local governments should balance their budget, what 
local public goods should be provided locally, and whether and how revenues ought to be shared between 
levels of government. The literature on fiscal federalism and multiple layers of government attempts to     
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give answers to these questions. It is doubtful whether there are good economic reasons for conducting 
cultural policy at the level of the European Commission. A large part of the budget is devoted to prestige 
projects such as the Cultural Capital of Europe with little international spill-over effects and much of the 
cultural exchange that is supported is hampered by costly bureaucratic procedures. Since not all countries 
of Europe adhere to the arms’ length principle, it is difficult to avoid political intervention. Topics that 
are of a European nature (e.g., competition policy, trade policy) are, typically, not the responsibility of 
Ministers of Culture. The European Councils of the Ministers of Culture have very tiny agendas and 
serve mainly the purpose of symbol politics.    
 
8. International cultural policy: different approaches in Europe 
Most countries of Europe make an effort to develop international cultural policy - e.g., Annalin (2003) 
and the website www.culturalpolicies.net. Typically, this is the responsibility of both the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture (or Heritage for Hungary). In some cases the international 
positioning of culture is done with the departments responsible for media and sport (UK), education 
(Finland), sciences (Austria), sport and tourism (Ireland), or communication (France). In some countries 
cooperation between the two key ministries has resulted in a central institute for international cultural 
exchange (Denmark, the Netherlands) and in others these ministries work together on a continuing basis 
(France, Finland). In others the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the lead (Austria, UK, and Sweden) and 
may make use of cultural institutes abroad (such as the British Council and the French, Swedish or 
Finnish Institutes). Sometimes the Ministry of Culture is primarily responsible (Hungary) and elsewhere 
there discussions are going in that direction (Ireland, Sweden). In some cases international cultural policy 
is shaped in collaboration with the regions (UK). Most countries engage in bilateral and multilateral 
cultural treaties (in particular France with its many cultural specialists and Alliances Françaises) and join 
forces regionally (e.g., the Nordic Council, Finland with the Baltic countries). They also develop 
international cultural policy together with the Council of Europe, the EU and UNESCO. 
  Different definitions of international cultural policy formulation are used. Most countries use a 
very broad concept of culture (Denmark, Finland, France, Austria, UK and Sweden). Some of these 
countries tie international cultural policy closely with development policy (Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland) or with efforts to stabilise regions such as the Balkan (France, Austria, UK). International 
cultural policy often pays considerable attention to education (Finland, France and UK) and boosting 
creative industries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, UK and France). Other countries employ a narrower 
concept focusing at the arts, heritage and libraries (Ireland, Hungary).  
  In all countries one of the goals of international cultural policy is to help home cultural 
organisations to travel abroad. With a certain degree of national pride countries want to promote their     
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own culture abroad and gain mutual respect for each others’ culture. These forms of cultural diplomacy 
may help to further other objectives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, e.g., to help to win foreign 
contracts for home enterprises. The UK seems to have the biggest emphasis on economic interest. If this 
is the case, international cultural policy formulation is best seen as a side-kick of foreign affairs and has 
little to do with inducing a thriving international cultural exchange. From the point of view of the cultural 
sector it may be better to leave the initiative with the Minister of Culture. Then priority may be given to 
the highest artistic quality of culture offered abroad rather than popular expressions of culture geared 
towards other motives than the arts. It also seems more likely that priority will be given to fund and 
attract foreign expressions of culture that are not offered at home, e.g., Third World music, Berber 
culture, Bombay films, etc. (Denmark, France, Sweden, Netherlands). This added diversity has intrinsic 
value for the cultural climate of a country. Another reason is that it encourages more competition among 
home producers of culture, which also leads to a more thriving cultural climate. From this perspective 
some countries host the best foreign young visual artists, film directors, architects, musicians, etc. if they 
are judged to be of higher merit than home-grown talent. Not all countries agree (France). 
  It is important to measure the effects of international cultural policy. Although this has not been 
done on a systematic basis, promotion of Swedish and French music abroad seems to be successful. In 
France music sales abroad rose from 1.5 million items in 1992 to 39 million items in 2000, even though 
the French government probably judges this spectacular growth insufficient to counter the dominance of 
the Anglo-Saxon music industry. France also strives to promote their film, TV and radio abroad, again 
with some success. Denmark has with the films of its Dogma group shown considerable success abroad 
while Finland obtains similar results in music, design and dance. Not only Britain is trying to promote a 
‘cool’ image. Also, Austria wishes to change towards a more modern image building on, say, the popular 
music of Kruder and Dorfmeister. Both countries make use of branding, corporate identities and joint 
marketing approaches to promote their culture abroad. 
  There is a heated debate about whether one should adopt protectionist cultural policy or not. Some 
countries argue that it is better to empower artists so that they can compete on international markets (UK, 
Netherlands). Other countries (led by France) disagree strongly and coin their protectionist tendencies 
with the goal of promoting cultural diversity. This goal is not controversial if it amounts to special 
instruments to sell French films, books or music outside France or to offering ethnic minorities the 
chance to express their culture or to bring in more non-European culture within national borders. 
However, it is controversial if it boils down to keeping as much culture from the US out of Europe. 
Although there may be a case for promoting own-language products and blocking foreign-language 
products, this is generally a dangerous route to take and often in direct conflict with the objectives of 




9. Lessons for the making of cultural policy in Europe 
The governments of Europe believe that culture cannot be left to the whims of the market. They argue 
that culture is an experience good, takes time to enjoy and appreciate, and has strong social externalities. 
It is therefore unpalatable if only the cultural elite enjoy culture, because culture is like language in 
essence a social phenomenon. If culture is non-excludable and/or rival, it is a public good. Culture has 
social value, but it also has existence value, innovation value option value and intergenerational value. 
None of these factors are properly internalised by the market. Hence, governments of Europe work on a 
cultural policy that stimulates cultural education for school children, develops a taste for cultural goods 
that make a lasting impression, brings high culture to where ordinary people are (parks, squares, pop 
temples, etc.), boosts the programming and demand for high culture, finances cultural expressions that 
are non-excludable and/or rival or has social, existence, option or bequest value, and provides room for 
experiment and research & development. 
  The challenge for most European policy makers is to boost high culture, including the synergies 
with low culture, and strive for a democracy of culture by making sure that more people have the 
competence to appreciate and understand cultural expressions. Democracy of culture is not concerned 
with dumbing down high culture, but with making high culture available and accessible to broader, new 
and more diverse audiences. This enhances the public good character of culture. Furthermore, cultural 
expressions only become meaningful if they are confronted with a critical audience. Culture has to 
compete with many other leisure activities, which explains that cultural participation has over the last 
quarter of a century been stable while the level of education has risen substantially - see van den Broek 
and de Haan (2000). Culture in Europe has become a more normal, integral part of an omnivore diet of 
excursions, holidays, visits to leisure parks and even sport. Pine II and Gilmore (1999) stress that culture 
increasingly has to be an experience. High culture in Europe faces the danger over the next few decades 
of becoming marginalised as the leisure industry becomes even more professional, the young invest less 
and less in cultural competence, the circle of genuine art lovers becomes smaller and culture is to be 
found more often only in places of entertainment. Hence, many governments in Europe attempt to fight 
the dumbing down of society by ensuring that culture is more than mere amusement, invest in cultural 
competences and education, and give space for innovation and experiment. 
  Governments should avoid dead-weight losses and substitution, on the one hand, and lobbying and 
rent seeking on the other hand. If subsidies to art producers are allocated by committees of experts (as on 
arts councils), there is a real danger of `art for the sake of art' and an erosion of the public support for the 
arts. The French model is less attractive than the Dutch or British model, because it gives to much 
influence to bureaucrats and politicians and prestige objects. The Dutch model allows a greater possibility     
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for shaping cultural policy than the British model, but is more susceptible to lobbying. One should keep 
the committees of experts small, appoint the experts for not too long periods and allow interested laymen 
on the committees as well. Since the task of deciding on the artistic merit and financial needs of different 
cultural organisations is a difficult task, lobbies in the cultural sector are strong and politicians tend to 
focus on the short term and act in a time-inconsistent fashion, recent theories of delegation suggest it is 
best to delegate the execution of cultural policy to an independent Arts Fund while the Minister of 
Culture restricts itself to setting out a mission with clear priorities, criteria and budgets and making sure 
the Arts Fund adheres to the mission. 
  More demand-oriented subsidies, such as vouchers, interest free loans, matching funds finance, 
public-finance partnerships etc., stimulate the cultural sector to produce art for which there is a demand in 
society. The danger with this is that safe, boring, better known art wins from innovative art. Hence, 
special facilities are needed to stimulate experimental art and research & development. 
  The performing arts are labour intensive and suffer like education, health care and police from 
Baumol's cost disease. Productivity growth in the arts lags behind other sectors. Relative price increases 
and greater pressure for bigger art subsidies result. Still, the newly found riches of technical progress 
elsewhere leads to extra demand for culture, especially if culture is a luxury good. There may be a shift 
from unique to reproductive art expressions, from small-scale to large-scale productions and from labour-
extensive to labour-intensive productions. In addition, the performing arts are good at lobbying and 
letting themselves be heard. Hence, the performing arts may swallow a growing proportion of the total 
culture budget at the expense of other cultural needs. This is somewhat of a paradox, since the 
performing arts are much less a public good than reproductive art forms. The paradox is difficult to 
swallow, since subsidies for the performing arts profit a highly educated, high income minority living in 
the big cities. Hence, governments should be careful to provide sufficient funds for cultural causes which 
benefit current and future generations such as monuments, archaeology and museums. 
  Governments in Europe should avoid addiction to cultural subsidies and sustaining the status quo 
by allowing equal chances for newcomers and having a level playing field. In the Renaissance there was 
fierce competition between producers of art and also some degree of specialisation. Now a healthy gust 
of domestic and foreign competition and more market-oriented support from governments can be 
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